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We develop a theory of a firm in an environment with incomplete contracts. The firm’s 
headquarter decides on the complexity, the organization, and the global scale of its 
production process. Specifically, it decides: i) on the mass of symmetric intermediate inputs 
that are part of the value chain, ii) if the supplier of each component is an external contractor 
or an integrated affiliate, and iii) if the supplier is offshored to a foreign low-wage country. 
Afterwards we consider a related scenario where the headquarter contracts with a given 
number of two asymmetric suppliers. Our model is consistent with several stylized facts from 
the recent literature that existing theories of multinational firms cannot account for. 
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The production of most ￿nal goods requires intermediate inputs. How thinly the value
chain is ￿sliced￿, i.e., how many di￿erent inputs are combined in the production process for
a particular ￿nal product, is a choice made by ￿rms (Acemoglu et al., 2007): Some choose
a setting with multiple highly specialized components and narrowly de￿ned tasks, while
other ￿rms from the same industry rely on a substantially lower division of labor. We refer
to the chosen mass of intermediate inputs as the degree of complexity of a ￿rm’s production
process. For each component, a ￿rm then needs to decide whether to manufacture that
input inhouse or to outsource it to an external contractor. As is well known since Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), these organizational decisions (￿ make or buy￿)
matter in an environment with incomplete contracts, as they a￿ect the suppliers’ incentives
to make relationship-speci￿c investments. Finally, in a globalized world, ￿rms also need to
decide on the international scale of their value chain. Some ￿rms only source domestically,
while others collaborate with foreign suppliers either through arm’s length transactions or
through intra-￿rm trade (Grossman and Helpman, 2002).
An example that illustrates those di￿erent dimensions of a global value chain is the
￿Swedish￿ car Volvo S40, as discussed in Baldwin (2009). The production of this ￿nal good
certainly is a complex process that consists of multiple intermediate inputs. A substantial
share of those inputs is produced by independent suppliers, many of them from foreign
countries: the navigation control is made by Japanese contractors, the side mirror and fuel
tank by German, the headlights by American ones, and so on, while the airbag and the seats
are outsourced domestically within Sweden. Yet other inputs are manufactured inhouse. Of
those tasks, some are performed within the Swedish parent plants, while other components
are manufactured by foreign subsidiaries which are directly owned and controlled by Volvo.
Further examples of global sourcing strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) include
Nike, which relies heavily on foreign outsourcing, or Intel which mainly engages in vertical
foreign direct investment (FDI), see Antr￿s and Rossi-Hansberg (2009).
In this paper, we develop a theory of a ￿rm which decides on the complexity, the orga-
nization, and the global scale of its production process. We build on the seminal approach
by Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), who were the ￿rst to study global sourcing decisions under
incomplete contracts. Their model is restricted to a setting with a headquarter and one
single supplier, however. We extend that framework and consider multiple intermediate
inputs. Our model is consistent with several stylized facts from the recent empirical lit-
erature that neither Antr￿s and Helpman (2004, 2008), nor other papers on the structure
2of MNEs can account for. It therefore further reconciles the theory and the empirics of
multinational ￿rms.1
Speci￿cally, we ￿rst consider a model where the headquarter (the ￿producer￿) decides
on the mass of (di￿erentiated but symmetric) intermediate inputs that are part of the
value chain, similar as in Ethier (1982) or Acemoglu et al. (2007). The larger this mass
of components is, the more sliced is the value chain and the more specialized is the task
that each single supplier performs. This specialization leads to e￿ciency gains, but it
also generates endogenously larger ￿xed costs as it necessitates contracting with more
input suppliers. The producer furthermore decides, separately for each component, if the
respective supplier is an external contractor or an integrated a￿liate, and if the supplier is
o￿shored to a (low-wage, low-cost) foreign country. Our model ￿rstly predicts that ￿rms
di￿er in the complexity of their production process, both within and across industries.
Higher productivity and lower headquarter-intensity tend to increase the mass of suppliers
that a ￿rm chooses to contract with. Second, ￿rms may outsource some of their inputs but
vertically integrate others. This ￿hybrid sourcing￿ mode is prevalent in ￿rms with medium-
to-high productivity from sectors with low-to-medium headquarter-intensity. Third, ￿rms
may decide to o￿shore only some components, and this o￿shoring share tends to be higher
in more productive ￿rms and in less headquarter-intensive industries.
Afterwards, we turn to a related scenario where the producer contracts with a given and
discrete number of two suppliers providing asymmetric components. These components
can di￿er along two dimensions: i) the technological importance for the ￿nal product as
measured by the input intensity, and ii) the bargaining power of the respective supplier.
We show that ￿rms from sectors with high (low) headquarter-intensity tend to integrate
(outsource) both suppliers, particularly if the asymmetry across components is not too
strong. With intermediate headquarter-intensity and for stronger asymmetries there is
￿hybrid sourcing￿, i.e., one integrated and one external supplier. The component with
the higher input intensity is per se more likely to be outsourced, as this reduces the un-
derinvestment problem for the supplier. Yet, that supplier is also likely to have higher
bargaining power vis-a-vis the producer. If this latter e￿ect is su￿ciently strong, which
may be the case for highly sophisticated and speci￿c intermediate inputs, our model then
1Spencer (2005) provides a survey of the literature on international sourcing under incomplete contracts.
In this literature, there has been no contribution that jointly analyzes the complexity, the organization,
and the global scale of MNEs. A di￿erent model of multinational ￿rms is Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008). That model focuses particularly on the o￿shoring decision, but it is not based on incomplete
contracts and it neglects the complexity and organizational choices of MNEs. Helpman (2006) presents a
comprehensive overview of the recent literature on trade, FDI and ￿rm organization.
3predicts that the producer keeps the ￿more important￿ component, which generates more
value added, within the boundaries of the ￿rm.
The predictions of our model are then discussed in the light of the recent empirical
literature on multinational ￿rms. 2 That literature has started to carefully explore the
internal structure of MNEs, and also to test particular aspects of the baseline model by
Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) and the extension in Antr￿s and Helpman (2008). Several
predictions of these models are supported by the empirical evidence. 3 Other features of
the data are harder to understand with those baseline frameworks, however, while our
model can account for these stylized facts.
For example, Kohler and Smolka (2009), Jabbour (2008) and Jabbour and Kneller
(2010) show that most MNEs collaborate with many suppliers and often choose di￿erent
sourcing modes for di￿erent inputs ￿ as in the Volvo-example discussed above. In partic-
ular, Tomiura (2007) ￿nds that ￿rms which outsource some inputs while keeping others
vertically integrated are more productive than ￿rms which rely on a single sourcing mode
in the global economy. Furthermore, Alfaro and Charlton (2009) show that ￿rms tend to
outsource low-skill inputs from the early stages, while high-skill inputs from the ￿nal stages
of the production process are likely to be manufactured inhouse. Consistently, Corcos et al.
(2009) ￿nd that inputs with a higher degree of speci￿city are less likely to be outsourced.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic structure
of our model. Section 3 is devoted to the scenario with an endogenous mass of symmetric
components, while Section 4 looks at the case with two asymmetric inputs. In Section 5
we conclude and contrast the predictions of our model with stylized facts on the structure
of MNEs. In that section, we also point out some further testable predictions that have
not yet been explored, in order to motivate future empirical research.
2The empirical literature has emphasized the signi￿cance of MNEs for world trade, which according
to Corcos et al. (2009) are involved in about two thirds of all current international trade transactions.
Feenstra (1995) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996) show that trade in intermediate inputs has increased much
faster than trade in ￿nal goods over the last decades, which suggests a substantial increase in international
outsourcing. The importance of intra-￿rm trade is stressed by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and Badinger
and Egger (2010), who consistently ￿nd that vertical FDI tends to dominate horizontal FDI.
3Consistent with Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), the study by Nunn and Tre￿er (2008) ￿nds that intra-
￿rm trade is most pervasive for highly productive ￿rms in headquarter-intensive sectors, and Defever and
Toubal (2007) ￿nd that highly productive ￿rms tend to choose foreign outsourcing for components with
high input intensity. Consistent with Antr￿s and Helpman (2008), who consider partial contractibility and
cross-country di￿erences in contracting institutions, the study by Corcos et al. (2009) ￿nds that ￿rms are
more likely to o￿shore in countries with good contracting institutions, and Bernard et al. (2010) report
that institutional improvements favor foreign outsourcing. The studies by Feenstra and Hanson (2005),
Yeaple (2006), Marin (2006), and Federico (2010), among others, are also concerned with the internal
structure of MNEs and obtain empirical ￿ndings broadly in line with those baseline models.
42 Model
2.1 Demand and technology
We consider a ￿rm that produces a ￿nal good y for which it faces the following iso-elastic
demand function:
y = Y  p
1=( 1): (1)
The variable p denotes the price of this good, and Y > 1 is a demand shifter. The demand
elasticity is given by 1=(1   ) and is increasing in the parameter  (with 0 <  < 1).
Production of this good requires headquarter services and manufacturing components,
which are combined according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function:











The parameter  > 0 is a productivity shifter; the larger  is, the more productive is the
￿rm. Headquarter services are denoted by h and are provided by the ￿producer￿. The pa-
rameter H (with 0 < H < 1) is the exogenously given headquarter-intensity, and re￿ects
the technology of the sector in which the ￿rm operates. Consequently, M = 1 H is the
overall component-intensity of production. There is a continuum of manufacturing com-
ponents, with measure N 2 R+. Each component is provided by a separate supplier. The
supplier i 2 [0;N] delivers mi units of its particular input, and the aggregate component

















The parameter i 2 (0;1) re￿ects the intensity of component i within the aggregate M,
with
R N
0 jdj = 1. The total input intensity of component i for ￿nal goods production is















which is increasing in the ￿rm’s productivity and demand level.
4If all components are symmetric, as will be assumed in Section 3, then each one has an individual
input intensity equal to (1   H)=N.
52.2 Firm structure
The producer decides on the structure of the ￿rm, and this choice involves three aspects:
i) complexity, ii) organization, and iii) global scale of production. Complexity refers to the
mass of components that are part of the production process. Recall that overall component-
intensity M is exogenous and sector-speci￿c. For example, intermediate inputs generally
account for a larger share of total value added in the automobile than, say, in the software
industry. Yet, within a sector, a producer can still decide on how thinly she wants to
slice the value chain. If she chooses a ￿low￿ level of complexity, she relies on a setting
with relatively few and broad components with a high average input intensity i. An
increase in complexity lowers the average input intensity across the single components at
constant overall component-intensity M. The inputs then become more specialized, and
the respective suppliers have more narrowly de￿ned tasks. For example, the carburetor
system in car production may then no longer be provided by a single supplier, but di￿erent
parts (like the choke and the throttle valve) are provided by di￿erent suppliers.
Secondly, turning to the organizational decision, the producer decides separately for
each component if the respective supplier is integrated as a subsidiary within the bound-
aries of the ￿rm, or if that component is outsourced to an external supplier. The crucial
assumption is that the investments for all inputs are not contractible, as in Antr￿s and
Helpman (2004). This may be due to the fact that the precise characteristics of the in-
puts are di￿cult to specify ex ante and also di￿cult to verify ex post. As a result of this
contract incompleteness, the producer and the suppliers end up in a bargaining situation,
at a time when their input investments are already sunk. Following the property rights
approach of the ￿rm, see Grossman and Hart (1986) or Hart and Moore (1990), we assume
that bargaining also takes place within the boundaries of the ￿rm in the case of vertical
integration. This bargaining leads to a division of the total ￿rm revenue as given in eq.(4)
among the producer and the suppliers, where the bargaining power of the involved parties
depends crucially on the ￿rm structure, as will be explained below.
Finally, the producer decides on the global scale of production, i.e., on the location
where each component is manufactured. The headquarter itself is located in a high-wage
country 1, where ￿nal assembly of good y is carried out. Both under outsourcing and
vertical integration, the respective input suppliers may either also come from country 1, or
from a foreign low-wage country 2. In terms of the cross-country trade pattern, there is an
arm’s length transaction if the producer outsources a component to a foreign contractor,
and intra-￿rm trade (vertical FDI) if a foreign supplier is vertically integrated.
62.3 Structure of the game
We consider a game that consists of seven stages. Our aim is to solve this game by backward
induction for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The timing of events is as follows:
1. The ￿nal goods producer enters and learns about the ￿rm-speci￿c productivity .
2. The producer decides whether to exit immediately, or to remain active in the market.
3. If the ￿rm remains active, the producer simultaneously decides on: i) the complexity,
ii) the organization, and iii) the global scale of the production process. In particular,
i) she chooses the mass N of manufacturing components. ii) For each i 2 [0;N] the
organizational choice is given by i = fO;V g. Here, i = O denotes ￿outsourcing￿ and
i = V denotes ￿vertical integration￿ of supplier i. We order the mass N such that
each supplier j 2 [0;NO] is outsourced, and each supplier k 2 (NO;N] is vertically
integrated. Then,  = NO=N (with 0    1) denotes the outsourcing share, and
(1   ) = NV=N is the share of vertically integrated suppliers/components. Finally,
iii) for each i 2 [0;N] the producer decides on the country r = f1;2g where that
component is manufactured. We order the mass of outsourced suppliers NO such that
each supplier j 2 [0;NO
2 ] is o￿shored to the low-wage country 2, and each supplier
k 2 (NO
2 ;NO] is located in the high-wage country 1. Then, `O = NO
2 =NO denotes
the o￿shoring share among all outsourced suppliers (with 0  `O  1). Similarly,
`V = NV
2 =NV (with 0  `V  1) is the o￿shoring share among all integrated suppliers,
and the total o￿shoring share of the ￿rm is given by ` =   `O + (1   )  `V.
4. Given the choice fN;;`O;`Vg, the producer o￿ers a contract to potential input
suppliers for every component i 2 [0;N]. This contract includes an upfront payment
i (positive or negative) to be paid by the prospective supplier.
5. There exists a large pool of potential applicant suppliers for each manufacturing
component in both countries. These suppliers have an outside opportunity (wage)
equal to wM
r in country r = f1;2g. They are willing to accept the producer’s contract
if their payo￿ is at least equal to wM
r . The payo￿ consists of the upfront payment i
and the revenue share i that supplier i anticipates to receive at the bargaining stage,
minus the investment costs (which may di￿er across applicants). Potential suppliers
apply for the contract, and the producer chooses one supplier (either from country 1
or from country 2) for each component i 2 [0;N].
76. The producer and the suppliers independently decide on their non-contractible input
levels for the headquarter service (h) and the components (mi), respectively.
7. Output is produced and revenue is realized according to (2), (3), and (4). The
producer and the suppliers bargain over the division of the surplus value.
Starting with stage 7, following Grossman and Hart (1986) we assume that the pro-
ducer and the suppliers cannot write down enforcable contracts that specify the division of
revenue. The producer rather has to decide on the structure of the ￿rm (complexity, orga-
nization, global scale) in order to a￿ect the revenue distribution, since the ￿rm structure
pins down the bargaining power of the involved agents. We assume that the bargain-
ing process follows a generalized simultaneous multi-party Nash bargaining. 5 The surplus
value over which the N + 1 agents bargain is the total revenue R as given in eq.(4), and
the agents receive revenue shares that are re￿ective of their respective bargaining power.
The revenue share of component supplier i is given by i, and M =
R N
0 jdj denotes the
joint revenue share of all component suppliers. The revenue share realized by the producer
is written as H, and we have H = 1   M. The headquarter revenue share H re￿ects
the e￿ective bargaining power of the producer vis-a-vis the component suppliers. How the
￿rm structure in￿uences the bargaining power of the involved parties is analyzed later.
In stage 6, each component supplier i chooses mi so as to maximize iR   cM
i;rmi for
each i 2 [0;N], where cM
i;r denotes the unit cost level of the supplier for component i
that the producer has o￿ered the contract. The producer chooses h in order to maximize
HR cHh, where cH denotes the unit cost of providing headquarter services. We show in
Appendix A.1. that the agents choose the following levels of input provision:
m

i =   









with total revenue given by
R
 = ()


































Everything else equal, the investment by supplier i relative to that of some other supplier
j, (m
i=m
j), is increasing in supplier i’s revenue share i and input intensity i. Similarly,
5We propose a Nash bargaining as in Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), since the mass of suppliers N is
already determined at stage 7. We rule out the possibility of partial cooperation as in Acemoglu et al.
(2007), where the Shapley value is used to account for potential coalition formation.
8the producer invests relatively more the higher H and H are.
Next, in order to receive applications for each desired component input in stage 5, the
producer must o￿er contracts in stage 4 that satisfy the suppliers’ participation constraints.
For supplier i this implies that the individual payo￿ from forming the relationship, given
(5) and (6), must at least be equal to the attainable outside wage:
iR   c
M
i;rmi + i  w
M
r : (7)
In stage 3, the producer then chooses the structure of the ￿rm so as to maximize her
individual payo￿, HR cHh 
R N
0 jdj, subject to the revenue given in eq.(4), the incentive
compatibility constraints (5), and the participation constraints (7). Since the producer
can freely adjust the upfront payments i, these participation constraints are satis￿ed with
equality for all suppliers i 2 [0;N]. Rearranging i = wM
r   iR + cM
i;rmi, substituting
this into the individual payo￿ of the producer, and recalling that M = 1   H, it follows
that the producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the total payo￿ for all N + 1




jdj  cHh f, where f is the outside opportunity
wM
r aggregated across all (domestic and foreign) suppliers. Notice that the term f is
increasing in N as long as wM
r > 0, i.e., the participation constraints generate a ￿￿xed cost￿
that is endogenously increasing in complexity, as this necessitates contracting with more
suppliers.6 We additionally allow for exogenous ￿xed costs  f which arise independently
of the participation constraints, e.g. for general overhead costs. With overall ￿xed costs
given by F = f +  f, we can rewrite the total payo￿ as follows by using (4) and (5):












































where  = ()
=(1 ) is an alternative productivity measure.
Finally, similar as in Melitz (2003), a ￿rm learns about its productivity level  upon
entry, which is drawn from some density function g() with support [;1], where  > 0
denotes a lower bound. The ￿rm only stays in the market (in stage 2) when the variable
payo￿   Y  	 is su￿ciently large to cover the ￿xed costs F.
6We assume that outside opportunities may di￿er across countries, but not across suppliers from the
same country. This assumption could be relaxed without a￿ecting our main results. Our main results only
require that overall ￿xed costs for the ￿rm are increasing in complexity N.
93 Symmetric components
In this section we consider the case of symmetric components. We assume that the indi-




i 2 [0;N]. We ￿rst abstract from the global scale dimension, and focus on the complexity
and organization decision when all suppliers are located in country 1.
3.1 Closed economy
Notice that an increase in the complexity level N is associated with a uniform reduction
of the individual input intensities of all suppliers, as each supplier now performs a more
narrowly de￿ned task. We assume that this specialization leads to e￿ciency gains, similar
as in Acemoglu et al. (2007). Speci￿cally, we assume that unit costs are the same for
all suppliers, and are given by cM = c=Ns, with 0 < s < 1. The unit costs cM are thus
decreasing in N for all suppliers, and these cost savings are more substantial the larger s
is. Without loss of generality, we normalize the parameter c to unity (c = 1).
With symmetric components, and using (5), (8) and (9), the producer’s problem is to
maximize the following total payo￿:
 =   Y  	   N  w
M




































In subsection 3.1.1. we ￿rst study the case where enforcable contracts on the ex ante
division of revenue are possible. In that case, the producer maximizes eqs.(10) and (11)
simultaneously with respect to N and H. In subsection 3.1.2. we then study the incom-
plete contracts scenario where the producer cannot freely decide on the ex ante division
of the surplus, but has to choose the complexity and the organization of the production
process in order to a￿ect the division of revenue that results in the bargaining stage.
3.1.1 Optimal mass of suppliers and revenue division
When the producer can freely choose the headquarter revenue share H, then each supplier
receives a revenue share i = (1 H)=N due to symmetry. Using (10) and (11), the ￿rm’s
10variable payo￿   Y  	
 
N;H
can then be simpli￿ed as follows:


















a) Zero outside opportunity. When setting the suppliers’ outside opportunities to zero
(wM
1 = 0), the producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the variable payo￿ as given































s(1   H)(1   H)(4H + s(1   H)(1   H)). Notice that 0 < H
0 < 1
and N
0 > 0 for all 0 < s < 1, 0 < H < 1, and 0 <  < 1. It directly follows from the















Higher headquarter-intensity of ￿nal goods production leads to a larger optimal revenue
share for the producer. The intuition for this result is similar as in Antr￿s and Helpman
(2004, 2008): both the headquarter and the suppliers underinvest in the provision of their
respective inputs, and this underinvestment problem is more severe for the headquarter
(the mass of suppliers) the smaller (the larger) the revenue share H is. Ensuring ex ante
e￿ciency requires that the producer should receive a larger share of the surplus in sectors
where headquarter services are more intensively used in production.
The basic trade-o￿ with respect to the complexity choice N is novel in our framework.
It can be seen from (12) that the impact of N on the variable payo￿ is, a priori, ambiguous.
Intuitively, higher complexity leads to stronger specialization (i.e., lower unit costs cM),
which tends to increase the ￿rm’s revenue and payo￿. On the other hand, for a given share
H, higher complexity also ￿dilutes￿ the investment incentives for every single supplier,
because the individual input intensities decrease and the overall revenue share M = 1  
H has to be split among more parties. This negatively impacts on the ￿rm’s payo￿.
The optimal complexity N
0 balances the ￿cost saving￿ and the ￿dilution￿ e￿ect. Higher
headquarter-intensity H leads to a lower optimal complexity. The reason is the following:
11The optimal joint revenue share for the suppliers ( M) is decreasing in H, which tends
to jeopardize their investment incentives. To countervail this problem, the producer can
concentrate on relatively few components with a high individual input intensity. Although
the gains from specialization are smaller in that case, the resulting increases of i and i
again raise the suppliers’ incentives (see eq. (5)). 7
The stronger the cost savings from specialization are (the larger s is), the more pro￿table
is it to add components to the value chain, i.e., the higher is N
0. This increase in complexity
is then accompanied by a decrease in the optimal revenue share H
0 , since the incentives
for all component manufacturers must be maintained. 8 When s becomes very small, so
does N
0. Intuitively, the ￿cost saving￿ e￿ect disappears if s tends to zero. The ￿dilution
e￿ect￿ for the suppliers is still present, however, so that the optimal mass of components
would then also become very small.9 Notice that this is true even though contracting with
more suppliers leads to no increase in ￿xed costs as long as wM
1 = 0.
Finally, notice that the payo￿-maximizing choices (13) and (14) do not depend on .
Still, a ￿rm needs to be su￿ciently productive in order to remain in the market, since the
variable payo￿ must be large enough to cover the ￿xed costs  f. Hence, only such ￿rms
survive whose productivity level is above some threshold ^ 0 given in Appendix A.2.1.v.
b) Positive outside opportunity. Turning to the case with wM
1 > 0, recall that a
more complex production process leads to larger ￿xed costs f = NwM
1 , since the suppliers’
participation constraints must be taken into account. With a positive outside opportunity
there is thus an additional endogenous ￿complexity penalty￿ embedded in our model.
With wM
1 > 0, we cannot explicitly solve for N and H. However, using the two ￿rst-
order conditions for payo￿ maximization, it is possible to solve @=@H = 0 for H (N)
7It is, thus, not clear if the optimal revenue share of a single supplier (
i0) is increasing or decreasing in
headquarter-intensity H; there is a larger joint revenue share M when H is low (￿component-intensity
e￿ect￿), but this share is then split among many suppliers (￿complexity e￿ect￿). Using (13) and (14), it can
be shown that 
i0 = (1   H
0 )=N
0 is in fact hump-shaped over the range of H and achieves a maximum
at some level H
crit (see Appendix A.2.1.ii). In other words, single suppliers receive the highest revenue
shares in sectors with medium headquarter-intensity.
8We show in Appendix A.2.1.iii that N
0 = 1 if s is equal to some scrit. Suppose for the moment that
the set of suppliers N is discrete, by assuming that the unit mass of inputs on the interval [0;1] is provided
by a single supplier. In fact, if s = scrit, choosing a unit mass of inputs is optimal for the producer. The
corresponding optimal revenue share H
0 (s = scrit) in that case is identical to eq. (10) in Antr￿s and
Helpman (2004), where it is imposed exogenously that there is just one single component supplier. Their
baseline model is thus included in our framework as a special case. When s is smaller (larger) than scrit,
it is optimal to have less (more) than a unit mass of inputs.
9See Appendix A.2.1.iv for an analytical decomposition that illustrates the trade-o￿ between these
e￿ects more formally.
12with @H=@N < 0, which does not depend on wM
1 (see eq.(23) in Appendix A.2.2.i).
Substituting this into the other ￿rst-order condition, we can derive the following function:
@
@N















	0 depends only on N and represents the marginal change in the total payo￿ when
raising complexity, taking into account that H(N) is optimally adjusted. We know that
	0 = 0 is solved by N
0 as given in (14). With wM
1 > 0, the optimal mass of producers N
is determined by setting 	0 equal to wM
1 =(Y ) > 0, and since @	0=@N < 0 it follows that
0 < N < N
0 and 0 < H



















The downward-sloping thick curve in Figure 1 illustrates the function 	0. The optimal
mass of suppliers is where this curve cuts the horizontal line. An increase of wM
1 leads
to an upward shift, and an increase of  to a downward shift of this horizontal line. For
given values of wM
1 and H, more productive ￿rms thus collaborate with more suppliers,
since they can easier cope with the requirement to match their outside opportunities. Still,
all ￿rms choose a complexity level below N
0, i.e., the optimal complexity N is bounded.
Furthermore, the 	0-curve shifts to the left as H increases. Hence, when comparing
equally productive ￿rms, those from headquarter-intensive industries have lower optimal












Figure 1: Optimal complexity with (N) and without (N
0) increasing ￿xed costs.
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Figure 2: Distribution of revenue
In Figure 2 we illustrate the corresponding optimal headquarter revenue share. The
￿gure ￿rstly depicts the H
0 -curve for the benchmark case with wM
1 = 0. Since we know
from the ￿rst-order conditions that @H=@N < 0 (see Appendix A.2.2.i), it is clear that
the H-curve stretches out to the left if wM
1 > 0, which implies a higher H throughout
the entire range of H. The reason is that an increase in wM
1 , by reducing the optimal
complexity level, leads to a higher individual input intensity i = M=N for each supplier.
This raises the suppliers’ incentives and thereby allows for a larger optimal revenue share
H. Yet, this share is lower in ￿rms with higher productivity, i.e., the ￿rm-speci￿c H-
curve moves closer to the H
0 -curve. The intuition is that more productive ￿rms operate
more complex production processes, and to maintain the investment incentives, they need
to leave a larger revenue share M for the suppliers. In the limit, H converges to H
0 .
A stronger cost saving e￿ect s naturally leads to more suppliers (a higher N) and, thus,
to a lower H.10 Furthermore, higher productivity implies a higher total payo￿ , despite
the fact that more productive ￿rms have more complex production processes and, thus,
higher ￿xed costs. Higher productivity thus raises the variable payo￿ Y 	 stronger than
the ￿xed costs F = N  wM
1 +  f (see Appendix A.2.2.ii). Ultimately, a ￿rm only survives
if it is su￿ciently productive to cover these ￿xed costs, which are unambiguously larger
than in the previous case with wM
1 = 0. It is thus clear that the threshold productivity ^ 
is larger than the benchmark level ^ 0 given in Appendix A.2.1.v, even though we cannot
solve for ^  in closed form.
10Graphically, the 	0-curve in Figure 1 shifts to the right as s increases. In the corresponding Figure 2,
both the H
0 - and the H-curve stretch out to the right.
143.1.2 The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts
We now turn to the incomplete contracts scenario where the producer cannot ￿freely￿ decide
on the ex ante division of the surplus, but has to choose the complexity and the organization
of the ￿rm in order to a￿ect the division of revenue that results in the bargaining stage.
Following Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), we assume that external suppliers are in a better
bargaining position than integrated suppliers vis-a-vis the producer. This is due to the
fact that the producer has no ownership of the assets of external suppliers, while she does
have residual control rights over the assets of those suppliers that are integrated within the
boundaries of the ￿rm.
Speci￿cally, we assume that if the producer has outsourced all suppliers ( = 1), she is
able to realize an exogenously given revenue share H
min. Vice versa, if she has integrated
all suppliers ( = 0), she is able to realize a larger revenue share, H
max > H
min, as a result
of her asset ownership. For intermediate cases with 0 <  < 1, her realized revenue share
(her ￿e￿ective bargaining power￿) can be written as:

H =   
H
min + (1   )  
H
max: (15)
The producer can thus a￿ect her revenue share via the outsourcing share  = NO=N,
but she is contrained to the range between H
min and H
max.11 The remaining share
M = 1 H is left for the suppliers, and the individual revenue share of an outsourced and
an integrated supplier is denoted by O
i and V
i , respectively. Since M = NOO
i +NV V
i
must hold, it follows that NO  O
i =   (1   H
min) is the revenue share of the external
contractors, and NV  V
i = (1   )  (1   H
max) the share of the integrated a￿liates. 12
a) Zero outside opportunity. As before we start with the case where the suppliers’
outside opportunities are set to zero (wM
1 = 0). In this case, the producer’s problem is
11Notice that H
min and H
max are independent of N. The complexity of the production process, therefore,
does not directly a￿ect the bargaining power of the producer, which is plausible since the headquarter-
intensity is also exogenous and independent of N. It is possible to analyze cases where complexity system-
atically a￿ects the bargaining power (the realized revenue share) of the headquarter, but this complicates
the analysis without adding many further insights.
12The joint revenue share of all suppliers ( M) is thus unambiguously larger with complete outsourcing
( = 1) than with complete integration ( = 0). However, a single outsourced contractor in the ￿rst
scenario does not necessarily obtain a larger revenue share than a single integrated a￿liate in the second
scenario. That is, O
i with  = 1 need not be larger than V
i with  = 0, because NO and NV need not
be the same. Yet, in a constellation where outsourcing and integration coexist, it is clear that an external
supplier receives a larger revenue share than an integrated supplier ( O
i > V
i with 0 <  < 1).




with respect to N and ,
subject to the constraint (15). The term 	 is given by eq.(11).






is not binding, this maximization prob-
lem leads to an equivalent solution as described in subsection 3.1.1. In particular, if the
producer is able to choose the outsourcing share  in such a way that H exactly matches
H
0 as given in (14), she would target this payo￿-maximizing revenue distribution with
her organizational choice, and hence the corresponding complexity N
0 given in (13). Since
  H
min + (1   )  H
max = H


































max, she cannot achieve the unconstrained payo￿-
maximizing ￿rm structure. She would then aim for an outsourcing share  that aligns the
H given in eq. (15) as closely as possible with the optimal H
0
, and for the corresponding
constrained optimal complexity level ￿ also see Appendix A.3.
Figure 2 illustrates this problem. The ￿gure depicts the payo￿-maximizing H
0 that the
producer aims for. If the ￿rm operates in a headquarter-intensive sector, more precisely
a sector with H >  H
0 where the threshold  H




max so that the producer cannot achieve H
0 . Firms from those sectors choose
complete vertical integration, ~ 0 = 0, as this leads to the maximum possible revenue
share H
max for the headquarter; the corresponding constrained optimal complexity level
is analyzed soon. Vice versa, if the ￿rm operates in a component-intensive sector, more
precisely a sector with H <   H
0 where the threshold   H
0 is de￿ned in Appendix A.3.1., the
producer also cannot achieve H
0 , and she then aims for the highest possible revenue share
for the suppliers by choosing complete outsourcing ( ~ 0 = 1). In sectors with   H
0  H   H
0 ,
the producer is not constrained by H
min  H
0  H
max, and she therefore sets ~ 0 = 
0
as given in (16). In those sectors with medium headquarter-intensity we thus observe
a coexistence of both organizational forms within the same ￿rm (hybrid sourcing), with
a higher outsourcing share in relatively more component-intensive industries within that
range (@
0=@H < 0 since @H
0
=@H > 0).13
13Du, Lu and Tao (2009) consider an extension of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) where the same input
can be provided by two suppliers. ￿Bi-sourcing￿ (one supplier integrated and the other outsourced) can
arise in their model out of a strategic motive, because it systematically improves the headquarter’s outside
option and, thus, her e￿ective bargaining power. Our model relies on an entirely di￿erent (non-strategic)
mechanism why ￿rms may choose di￿erent organizational modes for di￿erent inputs.
16Turning to the corresponding complexity decision, let ~ N0 denote the complexity choice
under incomplete contracts for the case with wM
1 = 0. To compute ~ N0, notice that in sectors
with H >  H
0 and H <   H
0 , ￿rms choose the same organizational form for all suppliers
(complete vertical integration and, respectively, complete outsourcing). For these cases
with a uniform organizational structure, we can simplify 	 as given in eq.(11) by setting
j = (1   ~ H
0 )=N where ~ H
0 = fH
min;H
maxg. Solving 	0 = @	=@N = 0 then yields:
~ N0 =










1   ~ H
0 H
 : (17)
It follows directly from (17) that ~ NO














is, vertical integration is endogenously associated with less complexity than outsourcing,
as the producer can reduce the underinvestment problem for the suppliers by choosing
fewer intermediate inputs. Next, for the unconstrained ￿rms in sectors with medium
headquarter-intensity   H
0  H   H
0 , where H = H
0 and 0  ~ 0  
0 < 1 holds, the








Figure 3 summarizes the results. Active ￿rms in sectors with low headquarter-intensity
have a huge mass of suppliers ( ~ NO
0 ), all of which are outsourced. Gradually moving to more
headquarter-intensive sectors, we ￿rst see no change in the ￿rms’ organizational structures
or the producer’s revenue shares, since ~ 0 = 1 and H = H
min as long as H <   H
0 . Yet, such
a gradual increase of H leads to a decreasing mass of suppliers ~ NO
0 , hence the most complex
production processes prevail in the most component-intensive sectors. 15 Once we turn to
sectors with a headquarter-intensity above   H
0 , there is a coexistence of both organizational
forms within the same ￿rm. The headquarter revenue share is gradually increasing, and the
outsourcing share is gradually decreasing in H. Complexity ~ N0 continues to decrease in H
and is equal to N
0 in that range. Finally, once H goes beyond  H
0 , further increasing the
headquarter-intensity has again no impact on organizational structures or the producers’
revenue shares, since ~ 0 = 0 and H = H
max if H >  H
0 . It still leads to a decreasing mass
of suppliers, which is now given by ~ NV
0 . Firms in the most headquarter-intensive sectors
are thus the least complex ones, and fully vertically integrated.
14 ~ N0 is continuous in H and ~ H
0 , so that it can be easily shown that ~ NO
0 > N
0 > ~ NV
0 holds.
15For a given , higher headquarter-intensity is thus inversely related to complexity, similar as in sub-
section 3.1.1. where we have shown that the optimal mass of suppliers N
0 also depends negatively on H.
Formally, @ ~ NO
0 =@H < 0 only holds if s < (1   ~ H
0 )=(1   ~ H
0 ). To avoid undue case distinctions, we
assume that the exogenous H
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Figure 3: Organization and complexity decision for the case with wM
r = 0.
The complexity and the organizational decision therefore have opposite incentive ef-
fects for the suppliers. Complete outsourcing (vertical integration) leaves a large (small)
combined revenue share for the suppliers, but this share is then divided among many (few)
of them. A stronger cost saving e￿ect (a higher value of s) is associated with a larger mass
of suppliers, other things equal.16 Moreover, the H
0 -curve in Figure 2 stretches out to
the right, and both  H
0 and   H
0 go up when s increases (see Appendix A.3.1.i). Complete
outsourcing is then chosen over a larger, and complete integration over a smaller domain
of H the larger s is, as it becomes relatively more attractive to choose the organizational
form that is endogenously associated with higher complexity, i.e., to choose outsourcing.
Finally, it is important to note that, as long as the suppliers’ outside opportunities are
set to zero (wM
1 = 0), there are no intra-sectoral di￿erences in the complexity and the
organization of ￿rms. That is, for a given headquarter-intensity, all active ￿rms in that
industry (regardless of productivity) would choose the same mass of suppliers and the same
outsourcing share. This is shown in the left panel of Figure 4. Here we depict the total
payo￿  as a function of  and H. A darker color indicates a higher complexity level.
Within every sector (i.e., moving parallel to the -axis), we see that higher productivity
implies a higher total payo￿, but it does not a￿ect the ￿rms’ complexity or organization.
Both di￿er only across sectors, such that a higher headquarter-intensity is associated with
less suppliers and more vertical integration (as also shown in Figure 3). Figure 4a fur-
thermore illustrates the decision whether to remain active in the market. For all ￿rms in
the hybrid range   H
0  H   H
0 , the threshold producitivity for survival, ~ 0, is identical
to ^ 0 given in Appendix A.2.1.v, while ~ 0 > ^ 0 must hold for all other ￿rms, as they






and cannot achieve the unconstrained payo￿
maximum. They hence need a higher productivity to break even.
16Formally, eq.(17) implies @ ~ N0=@s > 0 which applies for the ranges H <   H
0 and H >  H
0 , and eq.(13)
implies @N
0=@s > 0 which applies for the range   H
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Figure 4: Total ￿rm payo￿, complexity and organization.
b) Positive outside opportunity. We now focus on the case with endogenous ￿xed
costs (wM
1 > 0). We cannot explicitly solve for ~ N and ~  in this case, but similar as in
subsection 3.1.1. it is again possible to infer important comparative static results.
As in the previous case with wM
1 = 0, a single producer chooses the outsourcing share
 so as to realign the revenue share H from eq. (15) as closely as possible with the payo￿-
maximizing revenue share H, which then implies a corresponding complexity choice ~ N.







classify every ￿rm into one of the following three groups:












3. ￿rms with H












is not binding. These ￿rms










so as to exactly
match H. For the other groups the constraint is binding, and all ￿rms in group 1 choose
complete vertical integration, while all ￿rms in group 2 choose complete outsourcing.
The corresponding complexity choice can then be derived as follows: From eqs.(10) and
(11) we know that ~ N is determined according to 	0 = wM
1 =(Y ). For the unconstrained
￿rms, which are able to achieve H by setting ~  = , their complexity choice ~ N is
thus equivalent to the payo￿-maximizing N described above. For the constrained ￿rms,
we can de￿ne the following functions: 	O0  	0  
N;H = H




19	V 0  	0  
N;H = H
max;j = (1   H
max)=N

, which depend negatively on N and depict
the marginal change in the variable payo￿ for ￿xed values of H that correspond to the
headquarter revenue share under complete outsourcing and integration, respectively. In
Figure 5 we illustrate the curves 	O0 and 	V 0, and it can be easily shown that the former
curve always runs to the right of the latter (see Appendix A.3.2.). 17
The complexity choice that corresponds to every possible organizational decision is de-
termined by the intersection point of the respective downward-sloping 	0-curve with the
horizontal line at wM
1 =(  Y ). In Figure 5 we depict two ￿rms from the same industry,
one with ￿high￿ and one with ￿low￿ productivity. Suppose both ￿rms have the same or-
ganizational structure. The highly productive ￿rm then collaborates with more suppliers.
More importantly, for given  and H, we have ~ NO > ~ N0<<1 > ~ NV > 0. Hence, vertical
integration is endogenously associated with lower complexity. The intuition is similar as
above: Since the suppliers receive a relatively small joint revenue share with vertical inte-
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high N ɶ
Figure 5: Payo￿-maximizing mass of suppliers: The complexity decision.
To pin down the ￿nal complexity and organization decisions of ￿rms in di￿erent indus-
tries, it is crucial to note that the three groups of ￿rms de￿ned above can no longer be
delineated by the sectoral headquarter-intensity H alone. Recall from Figure 2 that the
H
0 -curve is increasing in H, and that wM
1 > 0 leads to an increase of H that is larger for
17Since 	 is continuous in H, it follows immediately that the 	0-curves for the intermediate cases with
0 < ~  < 1 ! H
min < H < H
max are located in between the 	V 0- and the 	O0-curve.
18Notice that ~ N always remains below the respective ~ N0 for the same organizational structure, which
is located at the intersection of the respective 	0-curve with the horizontal axis. Furthermore, it can be
shown that an increase in the headquarter-intensity H shifts all 	0-curves to the left and, thus, leads to
a smaller mass of suppliers for all possible productivities and organizational forms.




is no longer the same for all ￿rms
from the same industry (with the same H), but it is now ￿rm-speci￿c as it depends on .
Hence, ￿rms from the same industry no longer need to choose identical ￿rm structures.
The ￿nal complexity and organization decisions are summarized above in the right
panel of Figure 4. First, consider headquarter-intensive sectors with H >  H
0 . All ￿rms
from those sectors belong to group 1, and thus choose complete vertical integration. This is
for two reasons. This organization leads to the highest possible revenue share H
max for the
producer. Now this choice is reinforced, since vertical integration is also associated with
fewer suppliers and with lower ￿xed costs. There is, hence, no change in the organizational
decision of ￿rms in headquarter-intensive industries compared to the previous case with
wM
1 = 0, which is depicted in Figure 4a. In other words, in sectors with H >  H
0 , all ￿rms
(regardless of productivity) choose complete vertical integration. Figure 4b also shows that
not only the total payo￿ , but also the complexity level ~ NV is now increasing in . That
is, within a given headquarter-intensive sector, more productive ￿rms vertically integrate
more suppliers. Furthermore, comparing two equally productive ￿rms from two industries
A and B with H
A > H
B >  H
0 , it turns out that the ￿rm in sector A chooses less complexity
than the ￿rm in the relatively more component-intensive sector B.
Now consider component-intensive sectors where H <   H
0 . Without the endogenous
￿complexity penalty￿, all ￿rms in those sectors would belong to group 2 and choose complete
outsourcing (see Figure 4a). With wM
1 > 0, we observe that some ￿rms now switch
to group 1, and this is more likely: i) the lower productivity is, since the increase of
H is then most substantial, and ii) the closer H is to the upper bound   H
0 , since the
H can then easier exceed H
max. Those ￿rms now choose complete vertical integration,
and this organizational form is chosen to keep the ￿xed costs f low. There are also
￿rms whose H increases by less, so that it now falls inside the range between H
min
and H
max. These ￿rms then belong to group 3, and can choose the unconstrained payo￿-
maximizing  (with 0    1) and N. This is more likely to occur for ￿rms with medium
productivity, and in sectors with headquarter-intensity not too close to the upper bound
  H
0 . For ￿rms with high productivity, the increase of H due to wM
1 > 0 is negligible,
and they remain in group 2 and continue to choose complete outsourcing. Intuitively,
the higher ￿xed cost under outsourcing play a minor role for these highly productive
￿rms. Their main aim is to maximize the residual rights of the suppliers, whose inputs
are intensively used in those sectors. Similarly, ￿rms from highly component-intensive
sectors are also more likely to remain in group 2, i.e., to choose complete outsourcing.
21Summing up, the organization of ￿rms in component-intensive industries now varies over
the range of , particularly if M is not too low. Low productive ￿rms have few suppliers
which are fully vertically integrated. With rising productivity, there is a gradual increase
of complexity ~ N and the outsourcing share ~ , and the most productive ￿rms collaborate
with a huge mass of suppliers and choose complete outsourcing. 19
Finally, the organizational decision of ￿rms from sectors with medium headquarter-
intensity,   H
0  H   H
0 , is now also tilted towards more vertical integration. More
precisely, all ￿rms in those industries decrease their outsourcing share in response to an
increase of wM
1 . Firms with low productivity see a larger increase in H, so they are more
likely to become constrained by H
max and thus choose ~  = 0. This switch from group 3
to group 1 is also more likely to happen in sectors where H is only slightly below  H,
since the outsourcing share was already low there. Firms with high productivity and with
headquarter-intensity relatively close to   H are, in contrast, more likely to continue to
remain in the range between H
min and H
max. Those ￿rms would then still belong to group
3 and choose hybrid sourcing. Yet, since H has increased, this necessarily implies an




0.20 Overall, Figure 4b suggests
that the coexistence of integration and outsourcing is most pervasive in ￿rms with medium-
to-high productivity in sectors with low-to-medium headquarter-intensity.
3.2 Open Economy
We now incorporate the global scale dimension into the producer’s problem, who now also
decides on the country r 2 f1;2g where each component i 2 [0;N] is manufactured. We
assume that unit costs of foreign suppliers are lower than for domestic suppliers, while
the e￿ciency gains from specialization do not depend on the suppliers’ country of ori-
gin. Speci￿cally, domestic and foreign suppliers have unit cost equal to cM
1 = 1=Ns and
cM
2 = (`)=Ns, respectively, with 0 < (`) < 1.
19Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) obtain the opposite result, namely that headquarter-intensive sectors are
those where organizational structures are di￿erent across the productivity spectrum. That result is driven
by the ad-hoc assumption that integration is associated with exogenously higher ￿xed costs than outsourc-
ing. Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) consider the alternative ad-hoc assumption that outsourcing is
associated with exogenously higher ￿xed costs. Our model is qualitatively more consistent with the latter
paper, but in our model ￿xed cost di￿erences between organizational modes emerge endogenously as they
imply di￿erent optimal complexity levels. We could generate a similar sourcing pattern as Antr￿s and
Helpman (2004) when assuming that  f is su￿ciently higher under integration than under outsourcing.
20If an increase of wM
1 overall leads to more or less hybrid sourcing is unclear, since there is exit from
group 3 to group 1 but also entry from group 2 to group 3. To unambiguously sign the overall change
would require more speci￿c assumptions about the distribution of  and H across ￿rms.
22We assume the following speci￿cation for the ￿o￿shoring gain￿: (`) =
 
1 +    `
 1=`,
with   > 0 (also see Appendix B.1.).21 Using (`) and eq.(5), the producer’s problem is to
maximize the total payo￿  =   Y  	   (1   `)N  wM
1   `N  wM





































3.2.1 Optimal mass of suppliers, revenue division, and o￿shoring share
Analogous to the closed economy case, we ￿rst analyze the scenario where the producer can
freely assign the ex ante distribution of revenue. Taking into account that the optimal N
and H pin down 
i = (1   H)=N due to symmetric input intensities, we can simplify




from eq. (18) as follows:























Suppose the outside opportunity in both countries is equal to zero ( wM
1 = wM
2 = 0).
In that case, the producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing this variable payo￿. We
show in Appendix B.2. that the optimal complexity N
0 and revenue share H
0
 are identical
to their closed economy counterparts given in eqs.(13) and (14). Furthermore, it directly
follows that the variable payo￿ is unambigiously increasing in the o￿shoring share, i.e.,
@	=@` > 0. Hence, in that case where endogenous ￿xed costs play no role, the optimal
decision is to o￿shore all suppliers (`
0 = 1) in order to take advantage of the lower unit
costs in the foreign country. Now suppose that wM
1 = wM
2 > 0, i.e., ￿xed costs matter but
there are no cross-country di￿erences in the endogenous ￿complexity penalty￿. In that case
we would also obtain analogous results for N and H as in the closed economy case, and
again have ` = 1 since o￿shoring only generates advantages but no disadvantages.
However, as is widely known, o￿shoring in fact has disadvantages in terms of higher
communication and transportation costs, more expensive managerial oversight, and so
21This particular functional form is chosen for analytical simplicity only. It implies that there are
decreasing marginal returns from o￿shoring, i.e., the reduction of unit costs are most substantial for the
￿rst o￿shored component, and then become smaller as the o￿shoring share ` is increased. The strength
of the o￿shoring gain is also stronger the larger the parameter   is. Our qualitative results would be
similar for other speci￿cations of the o￿shoring gain, though mathematically the model would become
more di￿cult.
23on. To take this into account, we assume that there is an extra ￿xed cost fX > 0 per
o￿shored component, capturing those higher transaction costs for the ￿rm. Overall ￿xed
cost are then given by F = wM
1  (1   `)N + (wM
2 + fX)  `N +  f, and we assume that
  wM
2 +fX  wM
1 > 0, which allows us to rewrite ￿xed costs as F = (wM
1 +`)N +  f.22
When it comes to the maximization of the total payo￿  = Y 	 F with respect to `,
there is thus a trade-o￿ between the higher variable payo￿ ( @	=@` > 0) and the larger ￿xed
costs (@F=@` > 0) under o￿shoring. The positive e￿ect on the variable payo￿ is stronger
the higher the productivity level is, while the ￿xed cost increase does not depend on .
This suggests that o￿shoring is relatively more attractive for highly productive ￿rms. In
















More productive ￿rms thus have a higher optimal o￿shoring share ` (with 0  `  1).
Furthermore, as in the closed economy, they have a smaller optimal headquarter revenue
share and more suppliers, hence larger ￿xed costs. Still, it can be shown that the total
payo￿ is increasing in productivity, @=@ > 0. Second, ￿rms from more headquarter-
intensive industries have less suppliers and a larger optimal headquarter revenue share, as
in the closed economy case. Other things equal, the optimal o￿shoring share is also lower
in ￿rms from more headquarter-intensive industries. Finally, it is also possible to show
that @`=@  0, @N=@ < 0, and @H=@ > 0 (see Appendix B.2.2.). That is, lower
o￿shoring costs  (holding domestic ￿xed costs wM
1 constant) not only lead to a higher
optimal o￿shoring share, but they also boost complexity and thereby imply a lower optimal
headquarter revenue share.
3.2.2 The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts
Turning now to the incomplete contracts environment, ￿rst suppose that ￿xed cost consid-
erations play no role at all (i.e., wM
1 = wM
2 = fX = 0). In that case, the producer would
o￿shore all components (~ `O = ~ `V = 1) while making the exact same complexity and orga-
nization decisions as shown in Figure 4a. 23 Put di￿erently, all ￿rms with H <   H
0 would
completely rely on arm’s length transactions, those with H >  H
0 on intra-￿rm trade, and
22Suppliers from country 1 probably have a better outside opportunity than those from the poor country
2. Assuming  > 0 ensures that the o￿shoring cost fX outweighs the di￿erence in outside opportunities.
23This follows from the facts that: i) N
0 and H
0 are the same as in the closed economy, and ii) that






also does not change ￿ see Appendix B.3.1. for more details.
24those with   H
0  H   H
0 on a combination of the two global sourcing modes. Suppose
now that ￿xed costs matter, wM
1 > 0, but there are no cross-country di￿erences in overall
￿xed costs,  = 0. In that case, the same pattern as in Figure 4b emerges, where more
productive ￿rms choose higher complexity and where the organizational decisions are tilted
towards vertical integration in order to keep ￿xed costs low. Yet, all ￿rms (regardless of
productivity or headquarter-intensity) would only have foreign suppliers in that case.
The case with with wM
1 > 0 and  > 0 is the most interesting one. We then have
the aforementioned trade-o￿ between higher ￿xed costs and higher variable payo￿s under
o￿shoring. The higher  is, the more important is the latter aspect, hence productivity
and o￿shoring are positively related (@~ `=@  0, see Appendix B.3.2.). Furthermore,
since this trade-o￿ does not depend on whether a supplier is external or internal, there are
no di￿erences in the organization-speci￿c o￿shoring shares in our model with symmetric
components, but ~ ` = ~ `O = ~ `V holds. Summing up, the overall sourcing pattern in the open
economy can be described as follows:
1. Headquarter-intensive industries : All ￿rms choose complete vertical integration of
all suppliers. The least productive among the surviving ￿rms collaborate with few
suppliers and only source domestically. As productivity rises, ￿rms gradually increase
the mass of suppliers and the o￿shoring share. The most productive ￿rms collaborate
with a huge mass of foreign suppliers that are integrated into the ￿rm’s boundaries.
2. Component-intensive industries : The least productive among the surviving ￿rms
have few suppliers, all of which are domestic and vertically integrated. As productiv-
ity increases, ￿rms tend to increase the complexity ~ N, the outsourcing share ~ , and
the o￿shoring share ~ `. The most productive ￿rms collaborate with a huge mass of
suppliers, all of which are outsourced and o￿shored.
3. Industries with medium headquarter-intensity : Low productive ￿rms collaborate with
few suppliers and tend to choose vertical integration and domestic sourcing. For given
headquarter-intensity, increasing productivity is then associated with an increasing
o￿shoring share and higher complexity. With respect to the organizational decision,
￿rms in those sectors tend to choose hybrid sourcing, i.e., a coexistence of outsourcing
and vertical integration within the same ￿rm. Both the outsourcing and the o￿shoring
share tend to be lower in relatively more headquarter-intensive industries within that
range. The most productive ￿rms have many suppliers and completely rely on foreign
suppliers; they choose a combination of foreign outsourcing and intra-￿rm trade.
25If this pattern with respect to ~ N and ~  is similar as in the closed economy, it must
still be noted that the possibility to engage in o￿shoring is positively correlated with
complexity and outsourcing. To see this, consider a ￿rm with given  and H, and compare
the complexity and organization decision of that ￿rm under autarky (with wM
1 > 0 and
where ` = 0 is imposed) and in the open economy (with the same wM
1 > 0, and given
 > 0). As shown in Appendix B.3.2., no ￿rm would choose a lower mass of components
or a lower outsourcing share after the economy has opened up, while some ￿rms would
choose a higher ~ N and ~ . In other words, opening up to trade in intermediate inputs
boosts the slicing of the value chain and favors outsourcing. Notice that this ￿time series￿
correlation (identical ￿rms tend to choose more outsourcing after the economy has opened
up to trade) is consistent with a ￿cross-sectional￿ pattern across ￿rms, where many choose
vertical integration and domestic sourcing in order to keep ￿xed costs low.
4 Asymmetric components
In this last step of the analysis we consider a discrete setting with two asymmetric suppliers
denoted by a and b.24 These suppliers can di￿er along two dimensions in our model:
i) with respect to their input intensities M i for i = a;b (with a +b = 1), and ii) with
respect to their bargaining powers 

i, where  = O;V , which pin down the revenue shares
that they ultimately receive. With our Cobb-Douglas production function, M  i is the
partial output elasticity of component i and thus measures its technological importance
for ￿nal goods production. If components di￿er in their input intensities, this is likely
to be re￿ected in the bargaining power of the respective suppliers as well. Suppose one
component is technologically more important than the other. The supplier of the more
important input is then also likely to reap a larger revenue share from the producer than
the supplier of the less important component.
To give a real world example, consider the production of perfume. Alcohol is the base
material in this production process, and is needed in large quantities. But even though the
quality of the alcohol (the binder) also matters, it still generates low value added as it is
rather standardized. More value added is generated by the tiny amounts of the essential
oils and aroma compounds (such as ambra) which are highly speci￿c and characteristic
24It is straightforward to transform our model structure with a continuum of intermediate inputs into a
discrete notation. Divide the intervall [0;N] into X equally spaced subintervalls with all the intermediate
inputs in each subintervall of length N=X performed by a single supplier. We restrict our attention to the
case where complexity is exgenously given by N = 2, so that we neglect the cost saving e￿ect s.
26as they di￿erentiate the fragrances. In terms of our model, if a and b stand for ambra
and alcohol in perfume production, we thus have a > b and 
a > 

b. That is, ambra
is not only the technologically ￿more important￿ input, but its supplier also has higher
bargaining power (and receives a larger revenue share) due to the indispensability of this
particular component for the ￿nal product. Speci￿cally, we assume that the exogenous
revenue shares are such that V
i > O
i for i = a;b, and 
a > 

b for  = O;V . That is,
outsourcing yields a larger revenue share than integration for each supplier, and the ￿more
important￿ supplier a reaps a larger revenue share than b in either organizational form. 25
It is useful to ￿rst analyze the impact of these two types of asymmetries separately,
before considering them jointly. For brevity, we abstract from the global scale dimension
in this last section and assume that both suppliers are located in country 1.26 Given eqs.
(5), (8) and (9) with cH = ca = cb = 1, the producer’s problem is to optimize the total
￿rm payo￿  =   Y  	   2  wM





















The producer has to choose among four possible organizational forms, which we denote
as follows: fO;Og, fO;V g, fV;Og and fV;V g, where the ￿rst (second) element depicts
the organizational decision for input a (input b). This decision then pins down 

i and,




First suppose that the input intensities a and b are the same, but that supplier a is
ahead in terms of the exogenous bargaining power. We show in Appendix C.1. that 
i is
identical for both suppliers since a = b = 1=2. Furthermore, 
i = (1 H)=2 is increas-
ing in the overall component-intensity M = 1 H, as this raises the suppliers’ total input
intensity M=2. The producer’s problem is equivalent to choosing the organization that
aligns the 

i as closely as possible with the optimal revenue shares 
i . Figure 6 illustrates
this problem. If component-intensity is su￿ciently low, the producer vertically integrates
both suppliers, fV;V g, as this leaves them with the lowest possible revenue shares and,




b . In Figures 6 and 7b
below we depict the latter case, but all results would be similar with the alternative ranking V
a > O
b .
26It is possible to embed this model in an open economy context, where the producer may o￿shore
both, one or none of the components to the low-wage country 2. One can again split the total payo￿
into two parts: the variable payo￿ and the ￿xed costs, which are both higher under o￿shoring. Yet, the
former e￿ect is magni￿ed by ￿rm productivity while the latter e￿ect is not. This again implies that low
productive ￿rms source only domestically, while highly productive ￿rms o￿shore both suppliers. Firms
with medium productivity would o￿shore one component, and we can show that the producer would ￿rst
tend to o￿shore the component with the higher input intensity.
27in turn, maximizes H = 1   V
a   V
b  H
max. Conversely, if M is su￿ciently high,




intermediate component-intensity the producer chooses hybrid sourcing, and she would
then always outsource the ￿less important￿ input b while keeping the ￿more important￿
input a within the boundaries of the ￿rm. That is, with 
a > 

b and a = b = 1=2 there
can be hybrid sourcing of the type fV;Og but never of the type fO;V g . Asymmetry in
bargaining powers thus favors integration of the ￿more important￿ input, as it increases
the domain where the supplier can be properly incentiviced as an a￿liated subsidiary.
* *
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Figure 6: Revenue shares with two asymmetric components
Now consider the other case where the inputs a and b di￿er only in their input in-





Appendix C.2. we provide an algorithm to derive closed form solutions for the optimal
shares that the producer would choose if she could freely assign the ex ante revenue distri-
bution (with 
a +
b = 1 H). These solutions show that @H=@H > 0, @
a=@a > 0,
and @
b=@b > 0, which corroborates one key mechanism at work in this model: the higher
the input intensity of a component, the higher is the optimal revenue share that should
be assigned to its supplier. Clearly, with a > b we have 
a > 
b. When the available
revenue shares O and V are identical across suppliers, however, the producer would then
easier outsource the ￿more important￿ component a in oder to reduce the underinvestment
problem for the respective supplier.
28This is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 7. On the horizontal axis we depict the
headquarter-intensity of production, and on the vertical axis the technological asymmetry
across inputs (where a = 1=2 is the symmetric benchmark case). The di￿erent colors
indicate which organizational mode is payo￿-maximizing. As before, the producer would
vertically integrate (outsource) both suppliers for su￿ciently high (low) values of H. Hy-
brid sourcing is chosen in sectors with intermediate headquarter-intensity, and within this
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Figure 7: Organizational decision with two asymmetric components
The two di￿erent asymmetries thus have di￿erent implications for the ￿rm structure in
the hybrid range: While the asymmetry in bargaining powers favors vertical integration,
the asymmetry in input intensities favors outsourcing of the ￿more important￿ component.
As argued above, in practice both asymmetries are related and likely to emerge together.
In the right panel of Figure 7 we consider such a case and illustrate the implications for the
￿nal organizational decision. In this example, we have (
a 

b) = 0:2 for  = O;V , and we
focus on the range of intermediate headquarter intensity where hybrid sourcing can occur.
As can be seen, for high values of a the producer would choose the mode fO;V g and thus
outsource input a, because the asymmetry in input intensities is relatively stronger than
the asymmetry in the suppliers’ bargaining powers. Yet, if the technological asymmetry is
smaller (closer to 1=2), there is instead vertical integration of the ￿more important￿ input
a and outsourcing of the ￿less important￿ input b, i.e., the mode fV;Og.




In this paper, we have developed a theory of a ￿rm which decides on the complexity, the
organization, and the global scale of its production process. The main results of our model
can be summarized as follows:
i.) Complexity: Within a given industry, more productive ￿rms choose to have more suppli-
ers, i.e., more thinly sliced value chains or ￿ in the terminology of our paper ￿ more complex
production processes. When comparing equally productive ￿rms, we show that complexity
is higher in more component-intensive industries, and higher in ￿rms that choose outsourc-
ing than in vertically integrated ￿rms.
ii.) Organization: The organizational structure di￿ers across ￿rms, both within and across
industries. As in Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), higher component-intensity tends to fa-
vor outsourcing. Yet, in contrast to that model, our framework predicts that ￿rms may
also choose a hybrid sourcing mode where some components are outsourced while others
are vertically integrated within the ￿rm’s boundaries. This hybrid sourcing mode is most
prevalent in ￿rms with medium-to-high productivity from industries with low-to-medium
headquarter-intensity.
iii.) Global scale: More productive ￿rms tend to o￿shore more components, but only the
most productive ￿rms rely completely on foreign suppliers. Firm with medium produc-
tivity o￿shore some components but keep others domestic. For a given productivity, the
o￿shoring share tends to be higher in more component-intensive industries. Furthermore,
our model predicts that ￿globalization￿ boosts the slicing of the value chain and is pos-
itively correlated with outsourcing. More speci￿cally, moving from an autarkic scenario
to an open economy setting where trade in intermediate inputs is possible, we show that
identical ￿rms would choose more complexity and outsourcing in the open economy.
iv.) Asymmetric components : Finally, di￿erent asymmetries across components have dif-
ferent implications for the organizational structure of ￿rms. A technological di￿erence
per se favors outsourcing of the ￿more important￿ input, as this reduces the underinvest-
ment problem for the respective supplier. Yet, that supplier is also likely to have a higher
bargaining power vis-a-vis the producer. Provided this latter e￿ect is su￿ciently strong,
which may be the case for highly sophisticated and speci￿c intermediate inputs, our model
predicts that the producer keeps the ￿more important￿ component, which generates more
value added, within the boundaries of the ￿rm.
30Several of those predictions are consistent with stylized facts from the recent empirical
literature on multinational ￿rms. For example, recent empirical work by Jabbour (2008)
and Jabbour and Kneller (2010) shows that most MNEs are, in practice, characterized by
a high degree of complexity (i.e., multiple suppliers) and by hybrid sourcing. Consistently,
Kohler and Smolka (2009) emphasize that MNEs often choose di￿erent sourcing modes for
di￿erent suppliers. In particular, Tomiura (2007) shows that ￿rms which rely on hybdrid
sourcing tend to be more productive than ￿rms which rely on a single sourcing mode in the
global economy. This ￿nding is consistent with our framework for the case of intermediate
headquarter-intensity, which is likely to encapsulate many industries in the data. Finally,
Alfaro and Charlton (2009) show that ￿rms tend to outsource low-skill inputs from the
early stages, while high-skill inputs from the ￿nal stages of the production process ￿ which
generate a large share of total value added ￿ are likely to be integrated. In line with this
result, Corcos et al. (2009) ￿nd that inputs with a higher degree of speci￿city are less
likely to be outsourced. Our theoretical framework is consistent with this ￿nding if the
technological importance of particular inputs is materialized in a high bargaining power
of the respective suppliers. Our model may also motivate future empirical research, as it
leads to several predictions that have ￿ to the best of our knowledge ￿ not been confronted
with data yet. For example, it would be interesting to explore if trade integration has led
to a stronger unbundling of the production chain, or if (conditional on productivity) ￿rms
from headquarter-intensive industries systematically have fewer suppliers than ￿rms from
component-intensive sectors.
The model in this paper is about single ￿rms. It could potentially be embedded into
a general equilibrium framework where ￿rm interactions within and across industries are
taken into account. Such a framework would be useful to explore more fully the repercus-
sions of trade integration with cross-country di￿erences in market conditions, factor prices
and incomes, as well as their implications for global sourcing decisions. Furthermore, our
model is based on a simple static Nash-bargaining. In practice, suppliers may care about
long-term relationships, or may try to collude with other suppliers in order to induce
pressure on the headquarter. Finally, we focus on horizontal ￿slicing￿ of the production
chain in this paper, neglecting the fact that many components in reality consist themselves
out of multiple intermediate inputs, as recently argued by Baldwin and Venables (2010).
Exploring these and other extensions of our framework is left for future research.
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34Appendix A: Closed Economy
Remark. To simplify notation, we denote the ￿rst-order partial derivative of a function f with
respect to the argument x as f0
x in this Appendix. Analogously, the second-order partial derivative
with respect to the argument y is denoted as f00
xy.
A.1. Input provision. Supplier i 2 [0;N] chooses the level of input provision mi so as to
maximize i = iR   cM
i mi. Using eqs.(3) and (4), the ￿rst-order-condition (FOC) for the
maximization problem of supplier i can be written as follows:
0
mi = i  R0
mi   cM
i;r = i    M  i  R=mi   cM
i;r = 0: (20)
It directly follows that m
i = M i i R=cM
i;r solves the FOCs, with R given by eq. (6). It
remains to be shown that the second-order-conditions (SOC) are satis￿ed. Using the FOCs given
by eq. (20), the SOCs simplify to
00






i =  i    M  i  R 
 




and are thus satis￿ed. Using a similar approach, it can be shown that h =   H  H  R=cH
maximizes the payo￿ for the producer, H = HR   cHh.
A.2. Optimal mass of supplers and revenue division.
A.2.1. Zero outside opportunity
i.) Maximization problem : The ￿rst-order-conditions (FOCs) are given by 0
N =   Y  	0
N = 0
and 0
H =   Y  	0
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(1   )HM (MM   N (1   HH))
= 0: (22)
With eqs. (21) and (22) it is straightforward to show that N
0 and H
0
 as given in (13) and (14)




























notational convenience. The ￿rst diagonal element is given by 	00
NN =  	






> 0; T2 = (1   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NN is negative. The second diagonal element is given by 	00
HH =  	
0 (T3 =T4), with
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HH is also negative. The determinant can be written as j j = (	
0)
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ii.) Optimal revenue share of a single supplier. It is straightforward to show that 
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i0 is hump-shaped over the range of H. Note that H
crit is unambigiously decreasing in s.
iii.) Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) is a special case of our framework : We claim in footnote 8 that
there exists a scrit such that N








(1   (1   H))(1   H)(1   H)

;
and it can be veri￿ed that the optimal revenue share H
0
 (s = scrit) is identical to eq. (10) in
Antr￿s and Helpman (2004): H
0





iv.) Cost saving versus dilution e￿ect. In the following we restate operating pro￿ts as pro￿t
margin times the sold quantity. Pro￿ts are given by  =   Y  	 = R   C where C denotes









R: We rewrite 	 = (1   C=R)R = (p   C=y)y
where y and p denote the optimal quantity and price, respectively, and C=y are the average












so that we can restate p and y as: y = (R)
1= Y ( 1)= and p = (R)
( 1)= Y ( +1)=, and









To shed light on the two countervailing e￿ects of raising complexity, we now we discuss com-
parative statics with respect to N for a given H. Since R
N
0 < 0 it directly follows y
N
0 < 0 and
p
N












which is unambigiously increasing in N. Hence, higher complexity leads to a smaller quantity but
a larger pro￿t margin. For s ! 1, both y
N
0 ! 0 and p
N
0 ! 0. However, the pro￿t margin is
still strictly increasing in N. Hence, we have N
0 ! 1 for s ! 1. Although the dilution and the
cost saving e￿ect cannot be strictly decomposed analytically, we can still conclude that the cost
saving e￿ect dominates the dilution e￿ect when we trace the impact of an increase in N on the
pro￿t margain, while the dilution e￿ect dominates the cost saving e￿ect when tracing the impact
on the quantity.
































0 given in (13) and (14). Note that ^ 0 is increasing in  f and decreasing in Y .
A.2.2. Positive outside opportunity
i.) Maximization problem: The FOCs are given by 0
N =   Y  	0
N   wM
1 = 0 and
0

H =   Y  	0
H = 0. We can solve 	0
H = 0 for
H (N) =
N   1 + (1 + N)(1   )H + (1 + N)
 
H2   ~ 
2(H (1 + N)   1)
(23)
with ~  =
r
(1   H)(1   H)

(1   N)





Note that H (N) as stated in eq. (23) does not depend on wM
1 . Furthermore, it directly
follows that H0
N < 0. Using H (N) in 	0
N = 0 allows us to derive the implicit condition
	0 = wM
1 =(  Y ), which we can solve for N. It then directly follows from Appendix A.2.1.i),
37and from the fact that 	00
NN < 0 in the relevant domain, that N solves the ￿rst- and second-order
conditions and is, thus, the optimal complexity level. This N (as depicted in Figure 1) is then
associated with an optimal headquarter revenue share H = H(N = N) from (23) (as depicted
in Figure 2) that solves 	0
H = 0. From the condition 	0 = wM
1 =(  Y ) it also directly follows
that N

0 > 0 and N
wM
1
0 < 0 with N < N
0, and hence (since H0
N < 0): H





with H > H
0 . Finally, notice that 	00
NH < 0, hence N0
H < 0 and, thus, H0
H > 0.
ii.) Total pro￿ts: We claim that more productive ￿rms earn a higher total payo￿ , despite that
they have higher ￿xed costs. Total pro￿ts are given by  =   Y  	   wM
1 N. The optimal
mass of suppliers is implicitly given by 0
N =   Y  	0
N   wM
1 = 0. It then directly follows that
0
 = Y  	 + N0

 






= Y  	 > 0:
A.3. The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts.
Maximization problem: We know from Appendix A.2. that H and the associated N (H
0
and the associated N
0 for the case with wM
1 = 0) are payo￿-maximizing if the producer is
unconstrained in the choice of the revenue shares. Under incomplete contracts, since 0
H > 0 if
H < H and 0
H < 0 if H > H, it follows from continuity that the choice of  that aligns
H =   H
min + (1   )  H
max as closely as possible with H must be payo￿-maximizing, given







A.3.1. Zero outside opportunity
De￿nition of headquarter- and component-intensive industries :  H
0 and   H
0 are given by
 H
0 =






































max !   H
0 <  H
0 . Furthermore,  H0
0H
max > 0,   H0
0H
min
> 0,  H
0s
0 > 0, and   H
0s
0 > 0.
A.3.2. Positive outside opportunity
Notice from eq.(11) that 	00
NH = T8=T9, with:
T8 =  N (1   s)H + (1   s)MH + 
 
H2   1 + sM  
 + H
+
HN (1   s)
 
M + H  
 + H
+ (1   s)2  
1   H (1 + N)

2 > 0;
T9 = (1   )MH  
 M  
1   sM   H





NH < 0. Since H = H
max for 	V 0
and H = H
min for 	O0
, the former curve must
thus run to the left of the latter in Figure 5. Hence, we have ~ NV < ~ NO. The comparative static






is not binding, see
Appendix A.2.2.i). In particular, we have ~ N0
 > 0, ~ N0
wM
1
< 0 and ~ N0
H < 0 with ~ N < ~ N0.
Appendix B: Open Economy
B.1. Cross-country cost di￿erence. We assume the following speci￿cation for the ￿o￿shoring￿
gain:  (`) =
 
1 +    `





1 +    `
 (1+`)=` < 0 and 00
`` = (1 + `)
 
1 +    `
 (1+2`)=` > 0:
It directly follows from  (` = 0) = e   and  (` = 1) = 1=
 
1 +  

that 0 <  (`) < 1. Furthermore,
the strength of the o￿shoring gain is stronger the larger the parameter   is.
B.2. Optimal mass of suppliers and revenue division.
B.2.1. Zero outside opportunity
Maximization problem: Using eq.(18) we have: 0
N =   Y  	0
N, 0
H =   Y  	0
H, and
0
` =   Y  	0
`. Since 	0





=((1   )(1 + `)) > 0, we hence have `
0 = 1. It is
then straightforward to see that the other two FOCs, 0
N = 0 and 0
H = 0, can be expressed as in




 are the same as in the closed economy case. Furthermore, using a similar approach
as in Appendix A.2.1.i, we can show that the SOCs are also satis￿ed.
B.2.2. Positive outside opportunity





N +  f: The three
FOCs are given by:
0







H =   Y  	0
H = 0 , 0
` =   Y  	0
`   N = 0:
As in the closed economy, it is possible to solve 	0
H = 0 for H (N) with H
N < 0, which does
not depend on wM
1 or . Substituting H (N) into the other two FOCs leads to:
0




















 N = 0: (24)
For su￿ciently productive ￿rms we have 0
` > 0 for all ` 2 [0;1], since 	0
` > 0 and N approaches
39N
0 and is bounded from above. Hence, the global maximum is given by ` = 1. Vice versa, for
￿rms with su￿ciently low productivity, 0
` < 0 and hence ` = 0.
We are now interested in the SOC for the case where ` 2 (0;1). Assume that N and ` solve












  Y  	00
NN ;   Y  	00
N`   
  Y  	00




For negative de￿niteness of K we have to ensure that 00
`N =   Y  	00
`N    is small, which
can be achieved by setting the exogeneous parameter  su￿ciently high. If this parameter re-
striction holds, 	00
NN and 	00
`` are negative while the determinant jKj = 2  Y 2  	00
NN	00
``  
(  Y  	00
`N   )
2 > 0 is positive, so that the SOCs are unambiguously satis￿ed.













N ;   Y  	00
N`   
 Y  	0







   Y 2  	0
N  	00
`` + Y  	0










  Y  	00
NN ;  Y  	0
N
  Y  	00







   Y 2  	00
NN  	0
` + Y  	0




In words, more productive ￿rms have more suppliers and a non-decreasing o￿shoring share (strictly
increasing if ` 2 (0;1)). We can use these results to derive a relationship between the endogenous






0 > 0 if
` 2 (0;1) and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we know from solving the FOCs that H
N < 0. Hence,
it directly follows that H
N
0 < 0, and since N
`
0 > 0, it also follows that H
`
0  0 if ` 2 (0;1) and
zero otherwise. For the comparative statics with respect to  it thus follows that H

0 < 0, i.e.,
more productive ￿rms have a lower headquarter revenue share. Next, we derive the comparative







   Y  	00
NH ;   Y  	00
N`   
   Y  	00







 2  Y 2  	00
NH  	00
`` +   Y  	00





NH < 0. The optimal complexity is thus lower in more headquarter-intensive industries.
The comparative static results for H and ` follow directly, since H
N
0 < 0 implies H
H
0 > 0, and
N
`
0 > 0 implies `
H
0 < 0 if ` 2 (0;1) and zero otherwise. In words, the optimal o￿shoring share
40is smaller, while the optimal headquarter revenue share is larger in more headquarter-intensive







` ;   Y  	00
N`   







  Y  `  	00




The comparative static results for H and ` follow again directly, since H
N
0 < 0 implies
H

0 > 0, and N
`
0 > 0 implies `

0 < 0 if ` 2 (0;1) and zero otherwise.
iii.) Total pro￿ts: We claim that more productive ￿rms earn a higher total payo￿ , despite that





N +  f. Recall
that the FOCs are 0






= 0 and 0
` =   Y  	0
`   N = 0. It directly
follows that 0
 = Y  	 + N0

 
















= Y  	 > 0.
B.3. The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts.
B.3.1. Zero outside opportunity
Maximization problem: As shown in Appendix B.2.1., N
0 and H
0 are identical to the closed







as in the closed economy case. The constrained optimal complexity and organization choices are
thus identical to the closed economy case, while the global scale choice is given by ~ `0 = 1. The
thresholds  H
0 and   H
0 as given in Appendix A.3.1. apply.
B.3.2. Positive outside opportunity
Maximization problem: In sectors with medium headquarter-intensity (  H
0 < H <  H
0 ) the
producer can set the outsourcing share ~  = (H
max   H)=(H
max   H
min) such that H = H.
This implies ~ N = N and ~ ` = `. The comparative static results are derived in Appendix B.2.2.ii.
Since H0
H > 0 and ~ 0
H < 0 the outsourcing share is relatively lower the more headquarter-
intensive the industry is. In headquarter-intensive (H >  H
0 ) and component-intensive industries
(H <   H
0 ), the outsourcing share is constant and given by ~  = 0 and ~  = 1, respectively.
Conditional on ~  = 0 or ~  = 1 with H = H
min and H = H
max, respectively, the optimal
complexity level ~ N and o￿shoring share ~ ` are determined according to
0






= 0 and 0
` =   Y  	0
`   N = 0: (25)
As in Appendix B.2.2., for su￿ciently highly productive ￿rms we have 0
` > 0 for all ` 2 [0;1],
since 	0
` > 0 and ~ N approaches ~ N0 and is bounded from above. Hence, the global maximum is
given by ~ ` = 1. Vice versa, for ￿rms with su￿ciently low productivity: 0
` < 0 so that ~ ` = 0.
41We are now interested in the SOC for the case where ~ ` 2 (0;1). Assume that ~ N and ~ ` solve












  Y  	00
NN ;   Y  	00
N`   
  Y  	00




For negative de￿niteness of ~ K we have to ensure that 00
`N =   Y  	00
`N    is small,
as in Appendix B.2.1.i, which can be achieved by setting  high enough. If this parame-
ter restriction holds, the diagonal elements 	00
NN and 	00
`` are negative while the determinant 
  ~ K

  = 2Y 2	00
NN	00
`` (  Y  	00
`N   )
2 > 0 is positive, so that the SOCs are unambiguously
satis￿ed. Furthermore, if this parameter restriction holds, it is straightforward to prove the fol-
lowing comparative static results, which can be derived in a similar way as in Appendix B.2.2.ii:
~ N0
 > 0, ~ H

0 < 0, ~ `0
  0; ~ N0
H < 0, ~ H
H
0 > 0, ~ `0
H  0; ~ N0
 < 0, ~ H

0 > 0, ~ `0
  0.
Appendix C: Asymmetric components













(1   H)(1   H)(16   3H (5 + 3(1   H))
12(1   H)   8
: (26)
It directly follows from (26) that 
i
0
H < 0 ! 
i
0
M > 0. Notice that 
i =
 
1   H (N = 2;s = 0)

=2,
with H as given in eq. (14), leads to the same solution as (26).
C.2. Asymmetric input intensities. The FOCs reduce to 	0
H = 0 and 	0
a = 0. It is possible
to solve 	0
H = 0 for H (a). Using H (a) in 	0
a = 0 leads to 	0
ajH=H(a) = 0 and solely
depends on a. To illustrate the alogrithm we assume in the following H =  = 1=2. Then
	0
ajH=H(a) = 0 is equivalent to ￿nding a root 





2 (4 + a)
2(1   a)(1   2a)
+ a 
9(a)
2 (3 + a)
16(1   a)(1   2a)
 
3(a)
2 (3 + a)
16(1   a)(1   2a)
:
We propose the following change in variables that eliminates 2
a in R: 3




2 (4 + a)
i
=[2(1   a)(1   2a)]: This leads to R = Z3 + Z  P + Q where P and






















2 (a ( 2 + a (84 + a ( 205 + a (148 + a (1 + 2a)(4a   3)))))   4)
864

1   3a + 2(a)
2
3 ;
respectively, which solely depend a. Cardano’s formula leads to the solution Z that solves








































































subsituted to yield 
a;1, 
a;2 and 
a;3. Taken together, these 
a;1-
a;3 de￿ne the unique piecewise
solution for 
a. The corresponding optimal share H
can then be derived by using 
a in H (a),
derived from 	0
H = 0. The optimal share is then given by H
= H (a = 
a). The optimal
share 
b for the other supplier is the residual share given by 
b = 1   H   
a.
We have here illustrated the alogrithm for the example of H =  = 1=2. Other parameter
examples also reduce to a similar term as given by R (with polynomial degree of 3) and can be
solved analogously with the help of Cardano’s formula. Upon request we provide a Mathematica
￿le with the algorithm behind Figure 7.
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